A puzzle is generated by two intuitions about artworks: 1. There is no prima facie reason to take artworks to be mind-independent objects; 2. Aesthetic judgments are objective. These intuitions seem to be in tension, for if artworks or their aesthetic properties are mind-dependent, how can aesthetic judgments be objective? The common solution to the puzzle lies in rejecting or revising one of the two intuitions. Typically, realists reject 1, and many antirealists reject 2. I develop an antirealist aesthetic theory (...) that accommodates both intuitions, focusing on critical disagreement between epistemically optimal judges, realist difficulties with supervenience and response-dependence, the role of imagination in the experience of artworks, and the metaphorical quality of aesthetic discourse. The hallmark of realism, namely the mind-independence of aesthetic qualities, is an untenable commitment that yields an impoverished view of artworks. A cognitivist anti-realism is available which preserves the objectivity of aesthetic discourse and yields a richer conception of artworks and our interaction with them. (shrink)

At a 2011 meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers, N. T. Wright offered four reasons for rejecting the existence of soul. This was surprising, as many Christian philosophers had previously taken Wright's defense of a disembodied intermediate state as a defense of a substance dualist view of the soul. In this paper, I offer responses to each of Wright's objections, demonstrating that Wright's arguments fail to undermine substance dualism. In so doing, I expose how popular arguments against dualism fail, (...) such as dualism is merely an unwarranted influence of Greek culture on Christianity, and substance dualism is merely a soul-of-the-gaps hypothesis. Moreover, I demonstrate that Wright himself has offered a powerful reason for adopting substance dualism in his previous works. In conclusion I offer a view that explains why the human soul needs a resurrected body. (shrink)

Spiritual formation currently lacks a robust epistemology. Christian theology and philosophy often spend more time devoted to an epistemology of propositions rather than an epistemology of knowing persons. This paper is an attempt to move toward a more robust account of knowing persons in general and God in particular. After working through various aspects of the nature of this type of knowledge this theory is applied to specific issues germane to spiritual formation, such as the justification of understanding spiritual growth (...) on an integrative and holistic (heart and mind) model, the reality of hearing God’s voice, and knowing his activity, as well as how such a theory should change the shape of sermons, evangelism, and apologetics. (shrink)

Emergent substance dualism is explained in detail and several criticisms are raised against the view.

We argue there is a deep conflict in Paul Moser’s work on divine hiddenness. Moser’s treatment of DH adopts a thesis we call SEEK: DH often results from failing to seek God on His terms. One way in which people err, according to Moser, is by trusting arguments of traditional natural theology to lead to filial knowledge of God. We argue that Moser’s SEEK thesis commits him to the counterfactual ACCESS: had the atheist sought after God in harmony with how (...) God reveals himself, she would have had access to filial knowledge of God. By failing to incorporate arguments or propositional evidence for God’s existence, Moser’s account leaves the doubting seeker without any evidential reason to think that either SEEK or ACCESS is true. Without this rational motivation in place, the doubting seeker is unlikely to seek after God in the way ACCESS describes. We argue that natural theology provides an evidential epistemic aid to motivate persons to seek God the way ACCESS describes. Thus, Moser is mistaken. Such arguments can be evidentially helpful in coming to know God. In conclusion, we explain how our reply naturally fits how we form and maintain trusting interpersonal relationships with others. (shrink)

This essay explores the significance of Hegel’s considerations of love for his later dialectical philosophy in order to bring to attention love’s continued import as a category of logical and theological unity and reconciliation. A lingering question for Hegel scholarship is why he seemingly drops the unifying notion of love in his more developed dialectical philosophy, choosing instead to expound a philosophy of the concept that solely grants to reason the task of dialectical recovery. On my reading, this interpretation suffers (...) from a failure to imagine Hegel’s early writings on love as contributing to the working out of his later dialectical logic and philosophy of spirit, specifically in terms of the unifying and reconciling principle of Vernunft in contrast to Verstand. Furthermore, Hegel’s substantial appeals to love in the later Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion show love's continued significance for him, not only as a logical but a theological principle of unity between finite and infinite spirit, a unity lost on the understanding alone. Reading Hegel’s Vernunft as a form of rationally reconciling love, therefore, shows a continuity in Hegel’s thinking that brings to bear Hegel’s later philosophical developments of reason and spirit on his philosophical theology. (shrink)

This paper examines Thomas Aquinas’s condemnation of usury. In the first section, the details of Thomas’s teaching are examined with special attention to the so-called “extrinsic titles” discussed in the Middle Ages as qualifications of the moral and legal strictures concerning moneylending. The reminder of the paper examines the particular extrinsic title of Lucrum Cessans (compensation for lost profit), which Thomas rejects, and attempts to square that rejection with other texts implying that compensation for lost profit is a requirement of (...) justice when taken outside the context of moneylending. The paper concludes with some possible modern applications of Thomas’s position. (shrink)

The experience of pain is subjective, yet many people have their pain invalidated or not believed. Pain invalidation is associated with poor mental health, including depression and lower well-being. Qualitative investigations of invalidating experiences identify themes of depression, but also social withdrawal, self-criticism, and lower self-worth, all of which are core components of shame. Despite this, no studies have quantitatively assessed the interrelationship between pain invalidation, shame, and depression. To explore this relationship, participants recounted the frequency of experienced pain invalidation (...) from family, friends, and medical professionals, as well as their feelings of internalized shame and depressive symptoms. As shame has been shown to be a precursor for depression, we further explored the role of shame as a mediator between pain invalidation and depressive symptoms. All sources of pain invalidation were positively associated with shame and depressive symptoms, and shame fully mediated the relationship between each source of pain invalidation and depression. Relative to other sources, pain invalidation from family was most closely tied to shame and depression. Overall, findings indicate that one mechanism by which pain invalidation may facilitate depression is via the experience of shame. Future research may explore shame as a potential upstream precursor to depression in the context of pain. Findings provide more insight into the harmful influence of pain invalidation on mental health and highlight the impact of interpersonal treatment on the experiences of people in pain. (shrink)

Evangelical scholars have recently offered criticisms of mind-body dualism from the disciplines of theology, philosophy, and neuroscience. We offer several arguments as to why these reasons for abandoning mind-body dualism fail. Additionally, we offer a positive thesis, a dualism that brings together the best aspects of the Cartesian view and the Thomistic view of human persons. The result is a substance dualism that treats the nature of embodiment quite seriously. This view explains why we, as souls, require a resurrected body (...) as well as accounting for the great good of our embodiment in general. A human person is at the same time wholly soul and yet fully bodily. (shrink)

The transhumanist project of reshaping human beings by promoting their improvement through technological innovations has a broad agenda. This study focuses on the enhancement of the human organism through genetic modification techniques. Transhumanism values and a discussion of their philosophical background provide a framework to understand its ideals. Genetics and ethics are employed to assess the claims of the transhumanist program of human enhancement. A succinct description of central concepts in genetics and an explanation of current techniques to edit the (...) human genome serve to assess the capabilities and limitations of editing techniques. Potential benefits and liabilities of human enhancement through genome editing are discussed to appraise its feasibility. Ethical considerations of genome editing inform a reflection on the implications of introducing heritable changes in the genome of individuals. It is concluded that the transhumanist program is underpinned by a large number of hypotheses rather than by sufficient evidence. (shrink)

This collection looks from a variety of angles at the human body as it resists the determinations of gender, sexuality, socialisation and history. Ranging from classical hermaphrodites, Bruegel's blind faces and Weimar transgender surgery, via Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, state-socialist sport and Proust, to Barbie, Lari Pittman, American Psycho, IVF and video dance, the sixteen essays question the relationship between politics, culture and desire. This richly illustrated book also features the original work of two young photographers and a theatre director.

The posthumanist project proposes directing the evolution of human beings by promoting their improvement through technological means to create a variety of entities that will have few or no common...

The legal requirements and justifications for collecting patient-identifiable data without patient consent were examined. The impetus for this arose from legal and ethical issues raised during the development of a population-based disease register. Numerous commentaries and case studies have been discussing the impact of the Data Protection Act 1998 and Caldicott principles of good practice on the uses of personal data. But uncertainty still remains about the legal requirements for processing patient-identifiable data without patient consent for research purposes. This is (...) largely owing to ignorance, or misunderstandings of the implications of the common law duty of confidentiality and section 60 of the Health and Social Care Act 2001. The common law duty of confidentiality states that patient-identifiable data should not be provided to third parties, regardless of compliance with the DPA1998. It is an obligation derived from case law, and is open to interpretation. Compliance with section 60 ensures that collection of patient-identifiable data without patient consent is lawful despite the duty of confidentiality. Fears regarding the duty of confidentiality have resulted in a common misconception that section 60 must be complied with. Although this is not the case, section 60 support does provide the most secure basis in law for collecting such data. Using our own experience in developing a disease register as a backdrop, this article will clarify the procedures, risks and potential costs of applying for section 60 support. (shrink)

A 2011 National Academies of Sciences report called for an “Information Commons” and a “Knowledge Network” to revolutionize biomedical research and clinical care. We interviewed 41 expert stakeholders to examine governance, access, data collection, and privacy in the context of a medical information commons. Stakeholders' attitudes about MICs align with the NAS vision of an Information Commons; however, differences of opinion regarding clinical use and access warrant further research to explore policy and technological solutions.

Explores the moral dimensions of the current global role of the U.S. military.

Explores the moral dimensions of the current global role of the U.S. military.

Artworks frequently are the objects of multiple and apparently conflicting aesthetic judgements. This commonplace of the artworld poses a challenge for realist metaphysics, because to assert conflicting judgements of an artwork seems to amount to asserting p & p. Critical pluralism is an ever-more frequently invoked solution to this impasse. What its varieties share in common is the claim that the disagreement between judgements is only an apparent one. I argue, however, that critical pluralism masquerades either as relativism or anti-realism. (...) I examine a number of pluralist proposals, including one that attempts to reconcile pluralism with critical monism, and argue that they are inadequate to their advertised task. Finally, I sketch a solution employing dialetheic logic that captures both intuitions about these cases: that sometimes, judgements about artworks can truly conflict and jointly be true. (shrink)

Pre-philosophically, an artwork can lie in virtue of some authorial intention that the audience comes to accept as true something that the author believes to be false. This thought forces a confrontation with the debate about the relation between the interpretation of a work and the intentions of its author. Anti-intentionalist theories of artwork meaning, which divorce work meaning from the actual author’s intentions, cannot license the judgment that an artwork lies. But if artwork lying is a genuine possibility, then (...) anti-intentionalism must be rejected as false. (shrink)

Sometimes it is wrong to imagine or take pleasure in imagining certain things, and likewise it is sometimes wrong to prompt these things. Some argue that certain fictive imaginings—imaginings of fictional states of affairs—are intrinsically wrong or that taking pleasure in certain fictive imaginings is wrong and so prompting either would also be wrong. These claims sometimes also serve as premises in arguments linking the ethical properties of a fiction to its artistic value. However, even if we grant that it (...) might sometimes be wrong to imagine x or to take pleasure in imagining x, nothing follows about the ethical status of fictively imagining x, with or without pleasure. Prompting some fictive imagining is intrinsically wrong only when the fiction is a means to encourage for export from the fiction to the actual world some belief or attitude that it would be blameworthy to hold. The failure of arguments for the wrongness of certain fictive imaginings and their prompting lies in part in a failure to recognize that imagining x and fictively imagining x are distinct mental acts. This distinction blocks many arguments attempting to forge a link between a work's ethical properties and its artistic properties. (shrink)

A guilty pleasure is something that affords pleasure while being held in low regard. Since there are more opportunities to experience worthwhile pleasures than one can experience in a finite life, it would be better to avoid guilty pleasures. Worse still, many guilty pleasures are thought to be corrupting in some way. In fact, many so-called guilty pleasures can contribute to a good life, because they are sources of pleasure and because they do not actually merit guilt. Taking pornography as (...) a case study, I argue that in the absence of compelling evidence for its harmfulness, pornography can contribute to well-being by promoting autonomy, social recognition, knowledge and flourishing personal relationships. The case of pornography demonstrates an argumentative strategy for defending many so-called guilty pleasures as worthwhile elements of a flourishing life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 39.1 (2005) 105-118 [Access article in PDF] Sibley's Legacy Brandon Cooke Philosophy Department Auburn University Approach To Aesthetics, by Frank Sibley. John Benson, Betty Redfern, and Jerome Roxbee Cox, editors. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, 280 pp., $45.00 hardcover. Aesthetic Concepts: Essays After Sibley, edited by Emily Brady and Jerrold Levinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, 239 pp., $49.95 hardcover. Unquestionably, Frank Sibley should (...) be counted among those who helped return aesthetics to intellectual health and respectability as a proper field for philosophical investigation. He published no monographs outlining his views, but managed nonetheless to make highly influential contributions to research in aesthetics through a small number of papers. The two books under review in a sense are long overdue. Sibley died in 1996, before he could assemble a collection of his papers for publication in a single volume. Approach to Aesthetics is perhaps the next best thing — a collection of essays assembled and shaped by a highly conscientious editorial team. The book collects all of Sibley's published writings in aesthetics, together with a number of unpublished papers in various states of completion. The editors were confronted with the difficult question of what to do with many of these latter pieces. In the end, they made the unhappy but correct decision to leave out some work, which would have been of great interest but was still embryonic at the time of Sibley's death. But while we may not have in this volume the fullness of Sibley's mature thinking on aesthetics, the importance of its contribution to the literature is in no way diminished. Clarendon has published Aesthetic Concepts: Essays After Sibley as a companion to the collection of Sibley's work. It, too, is a valuable contribution, and evidence of Sibley's agenda-setting influence on subsequent work in aesthetics. First I shall explore some of the main themes of Sibley's thought in Approach to Aesthetics. Approach to Aesthetics "Aesthetic Concepts" leads off the collection. Sibley concentrates on two sorts of remarks we make in talking about art: those that "may be made by...anyone with normal eyes, ears, and intelligence," and those that require "the exercise of taste, perceptiveness, or sensitivity, of aesthetic discrimination or appreciation" (p. 1). Concepts in the second group are aesthetic [End Page 105] or taste concepts. Sibley notices that in support of aesthetic judgments, we often (but not always) adduce reasons which involve non-aesthetic concepts only. The question to ask, then, is just what is the relation between the two? Sibley remains deliberately uncommitted on the specific nature of the relation, except for the important claim that whatever it is, it is not condition-governed. That is, "there are no non-aesthetic features which serve in any circumstances as logically sufficient conditions for applying aesthetic terms" (p. 4). The claim is strict, and in the tradition which says that nothing can substitute for individual, spontaneous contact with an artwork to judge its aesthetic qualities; no application of principles will suffice. On the one hand, such a position makes aesthetic education quite an important task, if the distinctive qualities of artworks are out of reach even to those who are cognitively and perceptually well-equipped. And yet, if no rules or general standards can be brought to the experience of art, one might well wonder just how such an education is to be carried out. Sibley is aware of this tension. The solution lies first in realizing that the aesthetic terminology is not different in kind from "everyday" language. Even if in the art-related cases, some of those are deployed in metaphors, our understanding of their use here is deeply related to their ordinary uses. But then, what stops any one of us from seeing that a painting is imbalanced or lurid? Sibley describes the several ways in which the critic "gets his audience to see what he sees" (p. 18). These include pointing out salient non-aesthetic features, using the aesthetic terms themselves, making use of metaphors, contrasts, comparisons, and so on. In effect, the critic's... (shrink)

Felicia Ackerman argues that it is often wrong to use real people in fiction because it harms them. I argue that even when drawing from life is wrong, the unethical use of real people as literary material may nonetheless be rationally justified, and not in purely self-interested, instrumentalist terms. Either ethical considerations are always overriding, and much of our creative and appreciative practices are morally corrupt, or ethical and aesthetic values are incommensurable. I defend the plausibility of the incommensurabilist alternative, (...) and indicate how creative and appreciative choices might be rational even when the values in play are incommensurable. (shrink)

Aesthetic discourse is highly metaphorical, and many art-critical metaphors seem to be genuinely informative. Aesthetic property realism holds that the characteristic terms of aesthetic discourse pick out mind-independent properties. The prevalence of metaphor is a problem for realism, then, because most art-critical metaphors are true only when artworks are imagined in a certain way. Realist attempts to consign metaphor to the roles of filling lexical gaps or picking out mind-independent but ineffable properties fail. I argue that a cognitivist aesthetic anti-realism (...) is a better fit with a reflective understanding of our art-related practices. Metaphorical assertions about artworks can be truth-apt, but their truth depends essentially on our mental activity. (shrink)

Si les publics improbables sont, fondamentalement, des publics faibles, ils nous surprennent aussi – et c’est leur principal cadeau, leur caractère exemplaire. Par un art de la transgression, ils rappellent combien la vie publique est une affaire commune, façonnée par les gens à certains moments, en certains lieux, animés par la lutte et l’imagination, et par la joie de se découvrir les uns les autres. Cet article identifie quatre figures d’agentivité sonique pratiquées par ces improbables publics : l’invisible, l’entendu par-dessus (...) l’épaule, l’itinérant et le faible. (shrink)

Cognition in work teams has been predominantly understood and explained in terms of shared cognition with a focus on the similarity of static knowledge structures across individual team members. Inspired by the current zeitgeist in cognitive science, as well as by empirical data and pragmatic concerns, we offer an alternative theory of team cognition. Interactive Team Cognition (ITC) theory posits that (1) team cognition is an activity, not a property or a product; (2) team cognition should be measured and studied (...) at the team level; and (3) team cognition is inextricably tied to context. There are implications of ITC for theory building, modeling, measurement, and applications that make teams more effective performers. (shrink)

No longer holders of a discretionary right to intervene, all States are now burdened with the responsibility to take action under the doctrine of responsibility to protect …. [Potential intervener...

At various times in history, a single power finds itself, at least for its region and time, a 'sole remaining superpower'. This paper explores the parallels between Athens' superpower status at the end of the Persian War and the US's superpower status in the contemporary world. Athens mismanaged her situation in ways that precipitated her own demise in the Peloponnesian War. The question of what might be analogous to Athens' conduct in contemporary US policy is explored to serve as a (...) kind of 'cautionary tale' for modern US strategy. (shrink)